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Abstract
Many non-trivial sequential decision-making problems are
efficiently solved by relying on Bellman’s optimality prin-
ciple, i.e., exploiting the fact that sub-problems are nested
recursively within the original problem. Here we show how
it can apply to (infinite horizon) 2-player zero-sum partially
observable stochastic games (zs-POSGs) by (i) taking a
central planner’s viewpoint, which can only reason on a
sufficient statistic called occupancy state, and (ii) turning
such problems into zero-sum occupancy Markov games (zs-
OMGs). Then, exploiting the Lipschitz-continuity of the
value function in occupancy space, one can derive a version
of the HSVI algorithm (Heuristic Search Value Iteration)
that provably finds an -Nash equilibrium in finite time.
Keywords
POSG; partially observable stochastic game; Bellman’s op-
timality principle; Heuristic Search Value Iteration.
1 Introduction
Bellman’s optimality principle (Bellman’s OP) [3] led
to state-of-the-art solvers in many non-trivial sequential
decision-making problems, assuming partial observability
[25], multi-objective criteria [29, 21], collaborating agents,
e.g., modeled as decentralized partially observable Markov
decision processes (Dec-POMDPs) [13, 30, 9], or some
non-collaborative perfect information games (from Shap-
ley’s seminal work [26] to [6]). In all these settings this
principle exploits the fact that sub-problems are nested re-
cursively within the original problem. An open question
is whether—and how—it could be applied to imperfect
information games, which are encountered in diverse ap-
plications such as Poker [18] or security games [1]. This
paper answers this question in the setting of 2-player zero-
sum partially observable stochastic games (zs-POSGs), i.e.,
imperfect information games with simultaneous moves, per-
fect recall, discounted rewards and a possibly infinite time
horizon.
As general POSGs and Dec-POMDPs, infinite-horizon zs-
POSGs are undecidable, and their finite-horizon approx-
imations are in NEXP [22, 4]. As further discussed in
Section 2, solution techniques for finite-horizon POSGs,
or other impartial information games that can be formu-
lated as extensive-form games (EFGs), typically solve an
equivalent normal-form game [27] or use a dedicated regret-
minimization mechanism [34, 5]. They thus do not rely
on Bellman’s optimality principle, except (i) a dynamic
programming approach that only constructs sets of non-
dominated solutions [13], (ii) in collaborative problems (De-
centralized POMDPs), adopting the viewpoint of a (blind)
central planner [30, 9], and (iii) for (mostly 2-player zero-
sum) settings with observability assumptions such that one
can reason on player beliefs [12, 7, 2, 15, 8, 14]. Here,
we do not make any assumption beyond the game being
2-player zero-sum, in particular regarding observability of
the state and actions.
As for a number of Dec-POMDP solvers, our approach
adopts the viewpoint not of a player, but of a central (of-
fline) planner that prescribes individual strategies to the
players [30], which allows turning a zs-POSG into a non-
observable game for which Bellman’s optimality principle
applies. This is achieved in Section 4 (after background
Section 3) while reasoning not on a player’s belief over
the game state (as feasible in POMDPs or some particular
games), but on the central planner’s (blind) belief, a statistic
called occupancy state and that we prove to be sufficient for
optimal planning, as Dibangoye et al. did for Dec-POMDPs
[9]. In Section 5, our Bellman/Shapley operator is proved
to induce an optimal game value function that is Lipschitz-
continuous in occupancy space, which leads to deriving
value function approximators, including upper- and lower-
bounding ones, and discussing their initialization. Finally,
Section 6 describes a variant of HSVI for zs-POSGs, and
demonstrates its finite-time convergence to an -optimal
solution despite the continuous (occupancy) state and action
spaces.
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2 Related Work
Infinite horizon POSGs are undecidable [22], which jus-
tifies searching for near-optimal solutions, e.g., through
finite horizon solutions, as we will do. There is little work
on solving POSGs, in particular through exploiting Bell-
man’s optimality principle. One exception is Hansen and
Zilberstein’s work on finite horizon POSGs [13] , where
dynamic programming (DP) incrementally constructs non-
dominated policy trees for each player, which allows then
deriving a solver for common-payoff POSGs, i.e., decen-
tralized partially observable Markov decision processes
(Dec-POMDPs). Here, Bellman’s OP thus serves as a pre-
processing phase, while we aim at employing it in the core
of algorithms.
Dec-POMDPs Bellman’s OP appears as the core compo-
nent of a Dec-POMDP solver when Szer et al. [30] adopt
a planner-centric viewpoint whereby the planner aims at
providing the players with their private policies without
knowing which action-observation histories they have expe-
rienced. The planner’s information state at t thus contains
the initial belief and the joint policy up to t. This leads to
turning a Dec-POMDP into an information-state MDP, and
obtaining a deterministic shortest path problem that can be
solved using an A* search called MAA* (multi-agent A*).
Then, another important step is when Dibangoye et al. [9]
show that (i) the occupancy state, a statistic used to compute
expected rewards in MAA*, is in fact sufficient for planning,
and (ii) the optimal value function is piecewise linear and
convex (PWLC) in occupancy space, which allows adapting
point-based POMDP solvers using approximators of V ∗.
Subclasses of POSGs Recent works addressed particular
cases of discounted partially observable stochastic games
(POSGs), 2-player and zero-sum if not specified otherwise,
exploiting the structure of the problem to turn it into an
equivalent problem for which Bellman’s principle applies.
Ghosh et al. [12] considered POSGs with public actions and
shared observations, which can be turned into stochastic
games defined over the common belief space, similarly to
POMDPs turned into belief MDPs. Chatterjee and Doyen
[7], Basu and Stettner [2], and Horák et al. [15] considered
One-Sided POSGs, i.e., scenarios where (player) 2 (w.l.o.g.)
only partially observes the system state, and 1 has access to
the system state, plus the action and observation of 2. Cole
and Kocherlakota [8] considered (n-player) POSGs with in-
dependent private states, partially shared observability, and
i’s utility function depending on his private state and on the
shared observation. Horák and Bošanský [14] considered
zs-POSGs with independent private states and public obser-
vations, i.e., scenarios where (i) each player i has a private
state si he fully observes, and (ii) both players receive the
same public observations of each player’s private state. Any
player’s belief over the other player’s private state is thus
common knowledge.
Focusing on the work of Horák et al. [15, 14], in both cases
convexity or concavity properties of the optimal value func-
tion are obtained, which allow deriving upper- and lower-
bounding approximators. These approximators are then
employed in HSVI-based algorithms. Yet, moving from
MDPs and POMDPs (as in Smith’s work) to these settings
induces a tree of possible futures with an infinite branching
factor, which requires changes to the algorithm, and thus to
the theoretical analysis of the finite-time convergence. As
we shall see, the present work adopts similar changes.
Wiggers et al. [32] prove that, using appropriate representa-
tions, the value function associated to a zs-POSG is convex
for (maximizing) player 1 and concave for (minimizing)
player 2. Yet, this did not allow deriving a solver based on
approximating the value function. Here, we exploit no con-
vexity or concavity property of the optimal value function,
as they may not hold, but its Lipschitz continuity.
Imperfect Information Games Finite horizon (general-
sum) POSGs can be written as extensive-form games with
imperfect information and perfect recall (EFGs, often re-
ferred to as imperfect information games) [24], which makes
solution techniques for EFGs relevant even for infinite-
horizon POSGs. A first approach to solving EFGs is to
turn them into a normal-form game before looking for a
Nash equilibrium, thus ignoring the temporal aspect of the
problem [27] and inducing a combinatorial explosion. For
(2-player) zs-EFGs, this leads to solving two linear pro-
grams (one for each player). Koller and Megiddo [16]
propose a different linear programming approach for zs-
EFGs that exploits the temporal aspect through the choice
of decision variables, but still does not apply Bellman’s OP
(see also [31, 17]).
More recently, Counterfactual Regret minimization (CFR)
[34] has been introduced, allowing to solve large imperfect-
information games with bounded regret such as heads-up no
limit hold’em poker, now winning against top human play-
ers [5]. While some CFR-based algorithms use heuristic-
search techniques, thus somehow exploit the sequentiality
of the game, they do not rely on Bellman’s OP either.
3 Background
For the sake of clarity, the concepts and results of the EFG
literature used in this work will be recast in the POSG
setting. We shall employ the terminology of pure/mixed/be-
havioral strategies and strategy profiles—more convenient
in our non-collaborative setting—instead of deterministic
or stochastic policies (private or joint ones)—common in
the collaborative setting of Dec-POMDPs.
A (2-player) zero-sum partially observable stochas-
tic game (zs-POSG) is defined by a tuple
〈S,A1,A2,Z1,Z2, P, r,H, γ, b0〉, where
• S is a finite set of states;
• Ai is (player) i’s finite set of actions;
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• Zi is i’s finite set of observations;
• P z1,z2a1,a2 (s′|s) is the probability to transition to state s′
and receive observations z1 and z2 when actions a1
and a2 are performed in state s;
• r(s, a1, a2) is a (scalar) reward function;
• H ∈ N ∪ {∞} is a temporal horizon;
• γ ∈ [0, 1) is a discount factor; and
• b0 is the (public/common) initial belief state.
1 would like to maximize the expected return, defined as
the discounted sum of future rewards, while 2 would like to
minimize it, what we formalize next.
From the Dec-POMDP, POSG and EFG literature, we use
the following concepts and definitions, where i ∈ {1, 2}:
−i is i’s opponent.
θiτ = (a
i
1, z
i
1, . . . , a
i
τ , z
i
τ ) is a length-τ action-observation
history for i. The set of histories is Θi = Θi0 ∪Θi1 ∪
Θi2 ∪ . . . , with one subset per time step.
θτ = (θ
1
τ , θ
2
τ ) is a joint history at time τ . The set of joint
histories isΘ = Θ0∪Θ1∪Θ2∪ . . . , with one subset
per time step.
[oτ ] An occupancy state oτ at time τ is a probability dis-
tribution over state–joint-history pairs (s,θτ ). (o0 is
completely specified by b0.) The set of occupancy
states is O = O0 ∪ O1 ∪ O2 ∪ . . . , with one subset
per time step. Note that this notion applies to POSGs
despite the use of stochastic actions.
[pii0:τ ] A pure strategy for i is a mapping pii0:τ from private
histories in Θit (∀t ∈ {0 . . τ}) to single private actions.
By default, pii def= pii0:H−1.
pi0:τ = 〈pi10:τ , pi20:τ 〉 is a pure strategy profile.
[µi0:τ ] A mixed strategy µi0:τ for i is a probability distribu-
tion over pure strategies. It is used by first sampling
one of the pure strategies (at t = 0), and then executing
that strategy until t = τ .
µ0:τ = 〈µ10:τ , µ20:τ 〉 is a mixed strategy profile.
[βiτ ] A (behavioral) decision rule at time τ for i is a map-
ping βiτ from private histories in Θ
i
τ to distributions
over private actions. For convenience, we will note
βiτ (θ
i
τ , a
i) the probability to pick action ai when fac-
ing history θiτ .
βτ = 〈β1τ , β2τ 〉 is a decision rule profile (∈ Bτ , and noting
B = B0 ∪ B1 ∪ . . . ).
βiτ :τ ′ = (β
i
τ , . . . , β
i
τ ′) is a behavioral strategy for i from
time step τ to τ ′ (included). By default, βi def= βi0:H−1.
βτ :τ ′ = 〈β1τ :τ ′ , β2τ :τ ′〉 is a behavioral strategy profile.
[V0(o0,β)] The value of a behavioral strategy profile β in
occupancy state o0 (from time step 0 on) is:
V0(o0,β) = E[
∞∑
t=0
γtRt|O0 = o0,β],
where Rt is the random variable associated to the in-
stant reward at time step t. [Note: This definition
extends naturally to pure and mixed strategy profiles.]
The primary objective is here to find a Nash equilib-
rium strategy (NES), i.e., a mixed strategy profile µ∗ =
〈µ1∗, µ2∗〉 such that no player has an incentive to deviate,
which can be written:
∀µ1, V0(o0, µ1∗, µ2∗) ≥ V0(o0, µ1, µ2∗),
∀µ2, V0(o0, µ1∗, µ2∗) ≤ V0(o0, µ1∗, µ2).
In such a 2-player zero-sum game, all NESs have the same
Nash-equilibrium value (NEV) V ∗0 (o0)
def
= V0(o0, µ
1∗, µ2∗).
Finite horizon POSGs being equivalent to EFGs with imper-
fect information and perfect recall, the following key result
for EFGs applies to (finite H) POSGs:
Theorem 1. [19, 11] In a game of perfect recall, mixed
and behavioral strategies are equivalent. (More precisely:
Every mixed strategy is equivalent to the unique behavioral
strategy it generates, and each behavioral strategy is equiv-
alent to every mixed strategy that generates it.)
4 Solving POSGs as Occupancy
MGs
In this section, unless stated otherwise, we assume finite
horizons and exact solutions (no  error).
Here, we show (i) how a zs-POSG can be reformulated as
a different zero-sum Markov game, and (ii) that Bellman’s
optimality principle applies in this game.
4.1 From zs-POSGs to zs-OMGs
To solve a zs-POSG, we take the viewpoint of a central
planner that searches offline for the best behavioral strategy
profile before providing it to the players. This contrasts
with Dec-POMDPs where deterministic strategy profiles
suffice, and means exploring a (bounded) continuous space
rather than a (finite) discrete one as for Dec-POMDPs. Such
a planner grows a partial strategy β0:τ−1 by appending a
decision rule profile βτ .
Note that any partial strategy β0:τ is in one-to-one corre-
spondence with an occupancy state oτ . So, the controlled
process induced in occupancy space, where actions are de-
cision rule profiles, is both deterministic and Markovian
(see formal details about the dynamics below): applying
βτ in oτ (i.e., appending it to β0:τ ) leads to a unique oτ+1.
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Also, the expected reward at time τ is linear in occupancy
space (more precisely in the corresponding distribution over
states). All this allows reasoning not on partial behavioral
strategy profiles, but on occupancy states. The central plan-
ner will thus (i) infer occupancy states seen as “beliefs” over
the possible situations (“situation” here meaning the current
state s and the players’ joint action-observation history θτ )
which may have been reached, although without knowing
what actually happened, and (ii) map each occupancy state
to a decision rule profile telling the players how to act de-
pending on their actual action-observation histories.1 Each
zs-POSG is thus turned into an equivalent game, called
a zero-sum occupancy Markov game (zs-OMG)2 formally
defined by the tuple 〈O,B, T, r,H, γ, b0〉, where:
• O is the set of occupancy states induced by the zs-
POSG;
• B is the set of decision rule profiles of the zs-POSG;
• T is a deterministic transition function that maps each
pair (oτ ,βτ ) to the (only) possible next occupancy
state oτ+1; formally (see Lemma 7 in App. A.1),
∀s′, θ1τ , a1, z1, θ2τ , a2, z2,
T (oτ ,βτ )(s
′, (θ1τ , a
1, z1), (θ2τ , a
2, z2))
def
= Pr(s′, (θ1τ , a
1, z1), (θ2τ , a
2, z2))
= β1τ (θ
1
τ , a
1)β2τ (θ
2
τ , a
2)
∑
s
P z
1,z2
a1,a2 (s
′|s)oτ (s, θ1τ , θ2τ ));
• r is a reward function naturally induced from the zs-
POSG as the expected reward for the current occu-
pancy state and decision rule profile:
r(oτ ,βτ )
def
= E[r(S,A1, A2)|oτ , β1τ , β2τ ]
=
∑
s,θτ
oτ (s, θ
1
τ , θ
2
τ )
∑
a1,a2
β1τ (θ
1, a1)β2τ (θ
2, a2)r(s, a1, a2);
we use the same notation r for zs-POSGs as the context
shall indicate which one is discussed;
• H , γ, and b0 are as in the zs-POSG.
Note first that, for convenience, we directly consider behav-
ioral decision rules, which correspond to mixed strategies.
Of course, at τ , i’s possible actions should be decision rules
defined over histories that have non-zero probability in cur-
rent oτ . The dynamics being deterministic and the actions
public, both players of that new game (also denoted 1 and 2
while these are different players) know the next state after
each transition. But this is no standard zs Markov game
also since (i) the mixture of two actions is equivalent to
another action already in the (continuous) action space at
1In contrast, in a POMDP, the belief state depends on the agent’s
action-observation history, and is mapped to a single action.
2We use (i) “Markov game” instead of “stochastic game” because the
dynamics are not stochastic, and (ii) “partially observable stochastic game”
to stick with the literature.
hand, and (ii) at each time step, the state (occupancy) space
Oτ is continuous.
We shall study the subgames of a zs-OMG, i.e., situations
where some occupancy state oτ has somehow been reached
at time step τ , and the central solver is looking for rational
strategies (β1τ :H−1 and β
2
τ :H−1) to provide to the players. oτ
tells which action-observation histories each player could
be facing with non-zero probability, and thus which are
relevant for planning. We can then extend the definition of
value function from time step 0 only to any time step τ as
follows (using behavioral strategies):
Vτ (oτ , β
1
τ :H−1, β
2
τ :H−1)
= E[
∞∑
t=τ
γt−τRt|Oτ = oτ , β1τ :H−1, β2τ :H−1].
Note that oτ is in one-to-one relationship with a strategy
profile β0:τ−1|oτ 〉, so that we can denote β0:H−1|oτ 〉 its
concatenation with a βτ :H−1.
4.2 Back to Mixed Strategies
We now re-introduce, and generalize, mixed strategies as
a mathematical tool to handle subgames of a zs-OMG as
normal-form games, and give some preliminary results.
For a given oτ , letµ0:τ−1|oτ 〉 be an arbitrarily chosen mixed
strategy profile that leads to (/is compatible with) oτ , thus
defined over time interval 0 : τ − 1. To complete this mixed
(prefix) strategy, the central planner should provide each
player with a different (suffix) strategy to execute for each
θiτ it could be facing. We now detail how to build an equiv-
alent set of mixed (full) strategies for i. Each of the pure
(prefix) strategies pii0:τ−1 used in µ
i
0:τ−1|oτ 〉 (belonging to a
set denoted Πi0:τ−1|oτ 〉) can be extended by appending a dif-
ferent pure (suffix) strategy piiτ :H−1 at each of its leaf nodes,
which leads to a large set of pure strategies Πi0:H−1(pi
i
0:τ−1).
Then, let M i0:H−1|oτ 〉 be the set of mixed (full) strategies
µi0:H−1|oτ 〉 obtained by considering the distributions over⋃
pii0:τ−1∈Πi0:τ−1|oτ 〉
Πi0:H−1(pi
i
0:τ−1) that verify, ∀pii0:τ−1,∑
pii0:H−1∈
Πi0:H−1(pi
i
0:τ−1)
µi0:H−1|oτ 〉(pi
i
0:H−1) = µ
i
0:τ−1|oτ 〉(pi
i
0:τ−1). (1)
This is the set of mixed strategies compatible with oτ .
Lemma 1 (Proof in App. A.2). M i0:H−1|oτ 〉 is convex and
equivalent to the set of behavioral strategies βi0:H−1|oτ 〉,
thus sufficient to search for a Nash equilibrium in oτ .
While only future rewards are relevant when making a de-
cision at τ , reasoning with mixed strategies defined from
t = 0 will be convenient because Vτ (oτ , ·, ·) is linear in
µi0:H−1|oτ 〉, which allows coming back to a standard normal-
form game and applying known results.
In the remaining, we simply note µi (without index)
the mixed strategies in M i0:H−1|oτ 〉, set which we now
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note M i|oτ 〉. Also, since we shall work with local game
Q∗τ (oτ ,βτ ), let us define: M
i
|oτ ,βjτ 〉 the set of i’s mixed
strategies compatible with occupancy states reachable
given oτ and βjτ (with either j = i or j = −i). Then,
M i|T (oτ ,βτ )〉 ⊆ M
i
|oτ ,βjτ 〉 ⊆ M
i
|oτ 〉 (inclusion due to the
latter sets being less constrained in their definition). As
a consequence, if maximizing some function f over i’s
mixed strategies compatible with a given oτ :
maxµi∈Mi|oτ 〉 f(oτ , µ
i, . . . )≥ maxµi∈Mi
|oτ ,βjτ 〉
f(oτ , µ
i, . . . )
≥ maxµi∈Mi|oτ ,βτ 〉 f(oτ , µ
i, . . . ).
As can be easily demonstrated (cf. Lemma 8 in App. A.3),
any Nash equilibrium solution of our original game
V0(o0, ·, ·) induces a Nash equilibrium in any of its reach-
able subgames.3 But this does not tell whether Bellman’s
optimality principle applies, what we discuss next.
4.3 Bellman’s Optimality Principle
For any τ and oτ , let us define (i) β∗τ :H−1(oτ ) a NE profile
for the subgame at oτ , (ii) V ∗τ (oτ ) the NE value of the
subgame at any oτ , and (iii) the local subgame at oτ
Q∗τ (oτ ,βτ )
def
= r(oτ ,βτ ) + γV
∗
τ+1(T (oτ ,βτ )).
Then, given Nash equilibrium solutions for any oτ+1, the ap-
plicability of Bellman’s optimality principle shall be proved
if a Nash equilibrium of Vτ (oτ ,βτ :H−1) can be found by (i)
solving the local subgame Q∗τ (oτ ,βτ ) to get a decision rule
profile β∗τ and (ii) appending it to β
∗
τ+1:H−1(T (oτ ,β
∗
τ )).
An Abnormal-Form Game? A first question is whether
this game Q∗τ (oτ ,βτ ) is in fact a normal-form game, i.e.,
whether it could be defined by a payoff matrix over pure
decision rules, payoffs for behavioral decision rules being
obtained through linear mixtures.
Vτ (oτ , ·, ·) is linear in each player’s decision rule space at
each time step (i.e., in βiτ ′ for any i and τ
′ ∈ {τ . .H − 1}),
but multilinear in each player’s behavioral strategy space
(see Lemma 2 App. A.4.1), which suggests that Q∗τ (oτ , ·, ·)
may not be convex-concave (and thus not (bi)linear) in the
space of decision rules at τ . As a consequence, we are
possibly facing an abnormal-form game and cannot use von
Neumann’s Minimax theorem.
Properties of the Maximin and Minimax Values
Rather than digging the convexity-concavity property fur-
ther, we now show that computing the maximin and
minimax values of Q∗τ (oτ ,βτ ) induces finding a NE of
Vτ (oτ ,βτ :H−1) given NEs for any oτ+1.
Theorem 2 (Proof in App. A.4.2). In the 2p zs abnormal-
form game Q∗τ (oτ ,βτ ), the maximin and minimax values
are both equal to V ∗τ (oτ )—i.e., as previously defined, the
NEV for game Vτ (oτ ,βτ :H−1)—and correspond to a NES.
3In contrast, a subgame perfect equilibrium requires a Nash equilib-
rium in any subgame reachable by some strategy profile, which is more
constraining.
Proof. (sketch) The proof relies on first developing the max-
imin of Q∗τ (oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ ), then using (i) the equivalence of
maximin and minimax for mixed strategies (when von Neu-
mann’s minimax theorem applies), and (ii) the equivalence
of mixed and behavioral strategies.
Theorem 3 (Proof in App. A.4.2). As in 2p zs normal-
form games, game Q∗τ (oτ ,βτ ) has at least one NES; all its
NESs are all value-equivalent; and solving for maximin and
minimax values allows finding one NES.
Maximin and Minimax Computation The last results
tell us that we can exploit knowledge of the optimal value
function at τ + 1 (for all oτ+1) to find optimal decision
rules at τ for any given oτ by computing the maximin and
minimax values of the local (abnormal-form) game at hand.
Yet, we cannot use an LP as for normal-form games. To find
an appropriate solution method, let us now look at properties
of this game, noting that we lack any convexity/concavity
property, and presenting a preliminary result.
Lemma 2 (Proof in App. A.4.3). At depth τ , T (oτ ,βτ ) is
linear in β1τ , β
2
τ , and oτ , where βτ = 〈β1τ , β2τ 〉. It is more
precisely 1-Lipschitz-continuous in oτ (in 1-norm), i.e., for
any oτ , o′τ :
‖T (o′τ ,βτ )− T (oτ ,βτ )‖1 ≤ 1 · ‖o′τ − oτ‖1.
The Lipschitz continuity (LC) property would also hold in
2-norm or∞-norm, due to the equivalence between norms,
but with different constants.
Lemma 3 (Proof in App. A.4.3). For any τ and oτ ,
Q∗τ (oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ ) is Lipschitz continuous in both β
1
τ and β
2
τ .
The payoff function of our game is thus LC in each private
decision-rule space, which suggests using error-bounded
global optimization techniques, as Munos’s DOO (Deter-
ministic Optimistic Optimization) [23]. Here, searching for
a maximin (resp. minimax) value suggests using two nested
optimization processes: an “outer” one for the max (resp.
min) operator, and an “inner” one for the min (resp. max).
To ensure being within  of the maximin value, each process
could, for example, use an 2 tolerance threshold. Yet, in
such a nested optimization process, the inner process may
stop, at each call, before reaching 2 -optimality if it leads
the outer process to explore a different point.
Due to the continuous state space of zs-OMGs, V ∗ cannot
be computed exactly. We shall now see how to approximate
it, before exploiting the resulting approximators in a specific
version of HSVI in Sec. 6.
5 Properties of V ∗
In this section, we again assume finite horizon problems (un-
less stated otherwise). The main objective here is to propose
upper- and lower-bounding approximators that exploit V ∗’s
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Lipschitz continuity (rather than PWLC) property, as Fehr
et al. [10] did in the setting of (single agent) information-
oriented control, but here with simpler derivations.
5.1 Finite-Horizon Lipschitz Continuity of
V ∗
The following lemma proves that the expected instant re-
ward at any τ is linear in oτ , and thus so is the expected
value of a finite-horizon strategy profile from τ onwards
(trivial proof by induction).
Lemma 4 (Proof in App. A.5.1). At depth τ ,
Vτ (oτ ,βτ :H−1) is linear w.r.t. oτ .
Corollary 1 (Proof in App. A.5.1). V ∗τ (oτ ) is Lipschitz
continuous in oτ at any depth τ ∈ {0 . .H − 1}.
Refining the Lipschitz constant(s) We have just dis-
cussed the LC of V ∗ based on the LC of finite-horizon
strategies, reasoning on worst case Lipschitz constants (one
per time step) that hold for all strategies. Now, (i) could
we refine those constants based on knowledge regarding
V ∗, in particular upper and lower bounds U and L (see
next sections)? And (ii) could we make use of those refined
constants in the planning process?
Regarding question (i), U and L tell us that any strategy
profile from time τ on (and thus with remaining horizon
H) has values within Lminτ
def
= minoτ Lτ (oτ ) and U
max
τ
def
=
maxoτ Uτ (oτ ), hence the refined Lipschitz constant:
λLUτ =
Umaxτ − Lminτ
2
.
Regarding question (ii), as L and U are refined during the
planning process, these refined depth-dependent constants
would progressively shrink, thus speeding up planning! This
phenomenon could encourage improving the value function
bounds where they seem high (for U ) or low (for L).
5.2 Approximating V ∗
Note: For the sake of readability, the depth index τ may be
omitted when it can be inferred from the occupancy state.
Approximators An HSVI-like algorithm requires main-
taining both an upper and a lower approximator of V ∗. We
denote them U and L, and Vˆ = (L,U).
The LC of V ∗ suggests employing LC function approxima-
tors for U at depth τ (Uτ ) in the form of a lower envelope
of (i) an initial upper-bound U (0)(o) and (ii) downward-
pointing L1-cones, where an upper-bounding cone cUω =
〈ω, u〉—located at ω, with “summit” value u, and slope
λ(H−τ)—induces a function U (ω)(o)
def
= u+ λ(H−τ)‖ω −
o‖1. The upper-bound is thus defined as the lower envelope
of U (0) and the set of cones CUτ = {cUω }ω∈ΩUτ , i.e.,
U(o) = min{U (0)(o), min
ω∈ΩUτ
U (ω)(o)}.
Respectively, for the lower-bounding approximator at depth
τ : a lower-bounding (upward-pointing) cone cLω = 〈ω, l〉
induces a function Lω(o) = l − λ(H−τ)‖ω − o‖1; and the
lower bound is defined as the upper envelope of an initial
lower bound L(0) and the set of cones CLτ = {cLω}ω∈ΩLτ ,
i.e.,
L(o) = max{L(0)(o), max
ω∈ΩLτ
L(ω)(o)}.
(Point-based) Operator and Value Updates One can-
not apply an operator (notedH) to update a value function
approximator uniformly. Instead, when visiting some oc-
cupancy state o (at depth τ ∈ {0 . .H − 1}), we perform a
point-based update of the upper-bound U by (i) finding the
NEV of the following game (which relies on U at τ + 1):
U(o,βτ )
=
∑
s,a1,a2
(∑
θ
o(s,θ)β1(θ1, a1)β2(θ2, a2)
)
r(s, a1, a2)
+ γU (T (o,βτ ))
then (ii) adding a downward-pointing cone to CUτ . We note
KoU the upper bound after this update at point o. The same
applies to L with upward-pointing cones instead, and using
notation KoL.
5.3 Initializations
Due to the symmetry between players in a zs-POSG, with-
out loss of generality, let us look for an upper bound of
the optimal value function V ∗, i.e., an optimistic bound (an
admissible heuristic) for (maximizing) player 1. A usual ap-
proach to look for optimistic bounds is to relax the problem
for the player at hand. To that end, one can here envision
manipulating the players’ knowledge, their control over the
system, the action ordering, or the opponent’s objective,
e.g.:
1. providing more (e.g. full) state observability to 1;
2. providing less (e.g. no) state observability to 2;
3. letting 1 know what 2 observes;
4. letting 1 control chance (2’s choice would then only re-
strict the set of reachable states), but this would require
that 1 has full observability;
5. letting 2 act first, and telling 1 about 2’s selected action
(exactly or through a partial observation);
6. turning 2 into a collaborator by making him maximize,
rather than minimize, the expected return.
Accounting for related Markov models for sequential
decision-making, this suggests turning the zs-POSG at hand
for example into:
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• a Dec-POMDP by turning the opponent into a collabo-
rator (or even into a POMDP or an MDP); or
• a One-Sided POSGs [15] by combining (i) full state
observability, (ii) observability of 2’s observation, and
(iii) observability of 2’s action.
Note that making both players’ actions or observations pub-
lic (as in PO-POSGs [14]) would not be a viable solution as
this would imply providing more knowledge to both players
at the same time, which may prevent the resulting optimal
value function from being an upper bound for our problem.
6 HSVI for zs-POSGs
In this section, we assume infinite horizon problems (unless
stated otherwise) and -optimal solutions.
6.1 Algorithm
As we shall see, -optimally solving an∞-horizon zs-POSG
amounts, as often, to solving a problem with finite horizon
Hmax, which allows exploiting the results derived up to now.
For convenience, we assume Hmax already known and use
horizon-dependent constants (e.g., Lipschitz constants).
HSVI for zs-OMGs is detailed in Algorithm 1. As vanilla
HSVI, it relies on (i) generating trajectories while acting
optimistically (lines 9–11), i.e., player 1 (resp. 2) acting
“greedily” w.r.t. U (resp. L), and (ii) locally updating the
upper- and lower-bounding approximators (lines 8 and 13).
Here, computations of value updates and strategies rely on
solving our local zero-sum abnormal form games (possibly
a maximin/minimax optimization exploiting the Lipschitz
continuity as discussed in Sec. 4.3). A key difference lies
in the criterion for stopping trajectories. In vanilla HSVI
(for POMDPs), the finite branching factor allows looking
at the convergence of U and L at each point reachable
under an optimal strategy. To ensure -convergence at b0,
trajectories just need to be interrupted when the current
width at bτ (width(Vˆ (bτ )), where width(x, y)
def
= y − x) is
smaller than a threshold γ−τ . Here, dealing with an infinite
branching factor, one may converge towards an optimal
solution while always visiting new points of the occupancy
space. Yet, as the sequence of generated (deterministic)
trajectories converges to an optimal trajectory, the density
of visited points around it increases, so that the Lipschitz
approximation error tends to zero. One can thus bound
the width within balls around visited points by exploiting
the Lipschitz continuity of the optimal value function. As
proposed by Horák et al. [15], this is achieved by adding
a term −∑τi=1 2ρλτγ−i to ensure that the width is below
γτ  within a ball of radius ρ around the current point (here
the occupancy state oτ ). Hence the threshold
thr(τ)
def
= γ−τ −
τ∑
i=1
2ρλτγ
−i. (2)
Algorithm 1: zs-OMG-HSVI (in red: differences with HSVI)
1 Fct HSVI ()
2 Initialize L and U
3 while width(o0) >  do
4 RecursivelyTry (o0, τ = 0)
5 return L,U
6 Fct RecursivelyTry (o, τ)
7 if width(o) > thr(τ) then
8 Update (o)
9 βUτ ← NES(Γs(U))
10 βLτ ← NES(Γs(L))
11 o′ ← T (o, βU,1τ , βL,2τ )
12 RecursivelyTry (o′, τ + 1)
13 Update (o)
14 return
15 Fct Update (o)
16 L← Update (L, o) /* uses NEV(Γo(L)) */
17 U ← Update (U, o) /* uses NEV(Γo(U)) */
Setting ρ As can be observed, this threshold function
should always return positive values, which requires a small
enough ρ. For a given problem, the maximum possible
value ρ shall depend on the Lipschitz constants at each
time step, which themselves depend on the upper and lower
bounds of the optimal value function (and thus may evolve
during the planning process). For the sake of simplicity,
let us consider a single Lipschitz constant λ common to all
time steps, which always exists.
Lemma 5 (Proof in App. A.6). Assuming a single depth-
independent Lipschitz constant λ, and noting that
thr(τ) = γ−τ − 2ρλγ
−τ − 1
1− γ , (3)
one can ensure positivity of the threshold at any τ ≥ 1 by
enforcing ρ < 1−γ2λ .
We shall thus pick ρ in (0, 1−γ2λ ). But what is the effect of
setting ρ to small or large values?
• The smaller ρ, the larger thr(τ), the shorter the tra-
jectories, but the smaller the balls and the higher the
required density of points around the optimal trajectory,
thus the more trajectories needed to converge.
• The larger ρ, the smaller thr(τ), the longer the trajecto-
ries, but the larger the balls and the lower the required
density of points around the optimal trajectory, thus
the less trajectories needed to converge.
So, setting ρ means making a compromise between the
number of generated trajectories and their length.
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6.2 Finite-Time Convergence
First, the following result bounds the length of HSVI’s tra-
jectories using the bounded width of Vˆ and the exponential
growth of thr(τ).
Lemma 6 (Proof in App. A.6). Assuming a depth-
independent Lipschitz constant λ, and with W def= ‖U (0) −
L(0)‖∞, the length of trajectories is upper-bounded by
Tmax
def
=
⌈
logγ
− 2ρλ1−γ
W − 2ρλ1−γ
⌉
.
Note that (i) the classical upper-bound is retrieved when
ρ = 0 (Eq. (6.7) in [28]), and (ii) this gives us the maximum
horizon Hmax needed to solve the problem. Now, knowing
that any trial terminates in bounded time allows deriving
the following results, in order.
Theorem 4 (Proof in App. A.6). Consider a trial
(o0, . . . , oτ ) of length τ and consider that the backward
updates of Uτ−1 and Lτ−1 have not yet been performed.
Then
1. width(Koτ−1 Vˆ (oτ−1)) ≤ thr(τ − 1)− 2ρλτ , and
2. for every o′τ−1 satisfying ‖o′τ−1−oτ−1‖1 ≤ ρ, it holds:
width(Koτ−1 Vˆ (o′τ−1)) ≤ thr(τ − 1).
Theorem 5. Algorithm 1 terminates with an -
approximation of V ∗0 (o0).
Proof. (Adapted from [14]) Assume for the sake of contra-
diction that the algorithm does not terminate and generates
an infinite number of explore trials. Since the length of
a trial is bounded by a finite number Tmax, the number of
trials of length T (for some 0 ≤ T ≤ Tmax) must be infinite.
It is impossible to fit an infinite number of occupancy points
oT satisfying ‖oT − o′T ‖1 > ρ within OT . Hence there
must be two trials of length T , {oτ,1}Tτ=0 and {oτ,2}Tτ=0,
such that ‖oT−1,1 − oT−1,2‖1 ≤ ρ. Without loss of gener-
ality, assume that oT−1,1 was visited the first. According
to Lemma 4, the point-based update in oT−1,1 resulted in
width(Vˆ (oT−1,2)) ≤ thr(T − 1)—which contradicts that
the condition on line 11 of Algorithm 1 has not been sat-
isfied for oT−1,2 (and hence that{ot,2}Tt=0 was a trial of
length T ).
Note that the number of trials could be (tediously) upper-
bounded by determining how many balls of radius ρ are
required to cover occupancy simplexes at each depth.
7 Discussion
Inspired by techniques solving POMDPs as belief MDPs or
Dec-POMDPs as occupancy MDPs, we have demonstrated
that zs-POSGs could be turned into a new type of sequen-
tial game, namely zs-OMGs, allowing to apply Bellman’s
optimality principle. Value function approximators (with
heuristic initializations) can be used thanks to the Lipschitz
continuity of V ∗, and despite V ∗ possibly not being con-
cave or convex in any relevant statistic. A variant of HSVI
has been derived which provably converges in finite time to
an -optimal solution.
This approach was motivated by the fact that the corre-
sponding techniques for POMDPs and Dec-POMDPs pro-
vide state-of-the-art solvers. The time complexity of the
algorithm shall depend, among other things, on that of the
maximin/minimax optimization technique in use, and on
how many trials are required before convergence. We also
currently lack empirical comparisons of the resulting algo-
rithm with existing zs-POSG solution techniques.
Several implementation details could be further discussed
as the maximin/minimax error-bounded optimization algo-
rithm, the need to regularly prune dominated cones in U
and L, and the possible use of compression techniques to
reduce the dimensionality of the occupancy subspaces, as
in FB-HSVI [9].
Regarding execution, as in single-agent or collaborative
multi-agent settings, while exploration is guided by opti-
mistic decisions (greediness w.r.t. U for 1 and L for 2),
actual decisions should be pessimistic, i.e., 1 should act
“greedily” w.r.t. L, and 2 w.r.t. U .
Handling finite-horizon settings requires little changes. The
maximum length of trials shall be the minimum between this
horizon and the bound that depends on  and ρ. Addition-
ally considering γ = 1 shall require revising the Lipschitz
constants and some other formulas.
As often with Dec-POMDPs [30, 9], each player’s strategy
is here history-dependent, because one could not come up
with private belief states, which is feasible under certain as-
sumptions [15, 14]. One could possibly address this issue as
MacDermed and Isbell [20] did by assuming that a bounded
number of beliefs is sufficient to solve the problem.
Public actions and observations, as in Poker, could be ex-
ploited by turning the non-observable sequential decision
problem faced by the central planner into a partially observ-
able one, and thus the deterministic OMG into a probabilis-
tic one.
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A Appendix
This appendix mainly provides proofs of several theoretical claims of the paper.
A.1 From zs-POSGs to zs-OMGs
The following result shows that the occupancy state is Markovian, i.e., its value at τ only depends on its previous value (oτ−1),
the system dynamics (P z
1,z2
a1,a2 ), and the last behavioral decision rules (β
1
τ−1 and β
2
τ−1).
Lemma 7. Given an occupancy state oτ−1 and a behavioral decision rule profile βτ−1, next occupancy state oτ is given by
the following formula (for any s′, θ1τ−1, a
1, z1, θ2τ−1, a
2, z2):
oτ (s
′, (θ1τ−1, a
1, z1), (θ2τ−1, a
2, z2)) = β1τ−1(θ
1
τ−1, a
1) · β2τ−1(θ2τ−1, a2)
∑
s
P z
1,z2
a1,a2 (s
′|s) · oτ−1(s, θ1τ−1, θ2τ−1).
Proof. The proof goes by simply developing the definition:
oτ (s
′, (θ1τ−1, a
1, z1), (θ2τ−1, a
2, z2))
def
= Pr(s′, (θ1τ−1, a
1, z1), (θ2τ−1, a
2, z2))
=
∑
s
Pr(s, s′, (θ1τ−1, a
1, z1), (θ2τ−1, a
2, z2))
=
∑
s
Pr(s′, z1, z2|s, θ1τ−1, a1, θ2τ−1, a2) · Pr(s, θ1τ−1, a1, θ2τ−1, a2)
=
∑
s
P z
1,z2
a1,a2 (s
′|s) · Pr(a1, a2|s, θ1τ−1, θ2τ−1) · Pr(s, θ1τ−1, θ2τ−1)
=
∑
s
P z
1,z2
a1,a2 (s
′|s) · Pr(a1|s, θ1τ−1, θ2τ−1) · Pr(a2|s, θ1τ−1, θ2τ−1) · Pr(s, θ1τ−1, θ2τ−1)
=
∑
s
P z
1,z2
a1,a2 (s
′|s) · β1τ−1(θ1τ−1, a1) · β2τ−1(θ2τ−1, a2) · oτ−1(s, θ1τ−1, θ2τ−1)
= β1τ−1(θ
1
τ−1, a
1) · β2τ−1(θ2τ−1, a2)
∑
s
P z
1,z2
a1,a2 (s
′|s) · oτ−1(s, θ1τ−1, θ2τ−1).
A.2 Back to Mixed Strategies
The following result demonstrate that, instead of reasoning on mixed strategies constrained to be “compatible” with some
occupancy state oτ , one can reason equivalently with behavioral strategies.
Lemma 1. (originally stated on page 4) M i0:H−1|oτ 〉 is convex and equivalent to the set of behavioral strategies β
i
0:H−1|oτ 〉,
thus sufficient to search for a Nash equilibrium in oτ .
Proof. Let µi0:H−1|oτ 〉 and ν
i
0:H−1|oτ 〉 be two mixed strategies in M
i
0:H−1|oτ 〉, i.e., which are both compatible with occupancy
state oτ at time step τ , and α ∈ [0, 1]. Then, for any pii0:τ−1,∑
pii0:H−1∈Πi0:H−1(pii0:τ−1)
[
α · µi0:H−1|oτ 〉(pii0:H−1) + (1− α) · νi0:H−1|oτ 〉(pii0:H−1)
]
= α
 ∑
pii0:H−1∈Πi0:H−1(pii0:τ−1)
µi0:H−1|oτ 〉(pi
i
0:H−1)
+ (1− α)
 ∑
pii0:H−1∈Πi0:H−1(pii0:τ−1)
νi0:H−1|oτ 〉(pi
i
0:H−1)

(because both mixed strategies are compatible with oτ (eq. 1, p. 4:)
= α · µi0:τ−1|oτ 〉(pii0:τ−1) + (1− α) · µi0:τ−1|oτ 〉(pii0:τ−1)
= µi0:τ−1|oτ 〉(pi
i
0:τ−1).
Eq. 1 thus also applies to α · µi0:H−1|oτ 〉 + (1− α) · νi0:H−1|oτ 〉, proving that it belongs to M i0:H−1|oτ 〉 and, as a consequence,
that this set is convex.
The equivalence with the set of behavioral strategies simply relies on the fact that all mixed strategies over τ : H − 1 can be
independently generated at each action-observation history θi0:τ−1.
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A.3 Nash Equilibria in Subgames?
The definition of Nash equilibrium still applies in each of the infinitely many (induced) subgames and, as explained by the
following lemma, NEs are “nested”.
Lemma 8. A Nash equilibrium of Vτ (oτ , ·, ·) induces a Nash equilibrium in any (induced) subgame Vτ ′(oτ ′ , ·, ·) for τ ′ ≥ τ .
Proof. For any τ ∈ {0 . .H − 1} and any oτ , (i) Vτ (oτ , µ1, µ2) is linear in both µ1 and µ2, and (ii) the space of mixed strategy
profiles constrained by oτ is convex (Lemma 1). This allows applying von Neumann’s minimax theorem, so that this subgame
at oτ induces a 2-player zero-sum normal-form game for which at least one NE exists (and all NEs are equivalent).
Lemma 1 (p. 4) allows reasoning with behavorial strategy profiles instead of mixed ones, and we can focus on what happens
from τ on. So, let β∗τ :H−1 be a NES of Vτ (oτ , ·, ·). Then the definition of Nash equilibrium allows writing in particular,
∀β1τ+1:H−1:
Vτ (oτ , 〈β1,∗τ ⊕ β1,∗τ+1:H−1〉, β2,∗τ :H−1) ≥ Vτ (oτ , 〈β1,∗τ ⊕ β1τ+1:H−1〉, β2,∗τ :H−1),
thus,
r(oτ , β
1,∗
τ , β
2,∗
τ ) + γVτ+1(T (oτ , β
1,∗
τ , β
2,∗
τ ), β
1,∗
τ+1:H−1, β
2,∗
τ+1:H−1)
≥ r(oτ , β1,∗τ , β2,∗τ ) + γVτ+1(T (oτ , β1,∗τ , β2,∗τ ), β1τ+1:H−1, β2,∗τ+1:H−1)
or, equivalently,
Vτ+1(T (oτ , β
1,∗
τ , β
2,∗
τ ), β
1,∗
τ+1:H−1, β
2,∗
τ+1:H−1) ≥ Vτ+1(T (oτ , β1,∗τ , β2,∗τ ), β1τ+1:H−1, β2,∗τ+1:H−1).
With the symmetric property holding for player 2, this implies that β∗τ+1:H−1
def
= (β1,∗τ+1:H−1, β
2,∗
τ+1:H−1) is a NES of the
constrained 2-player zero-sum (normal-form) game Vτ+1(T (oτ ,β∗τ ), ·, ·). By induction, a NES is obtained for any subgame
Vτ ′(oτ ′ , ·, ·) (τ ′ ≥ τ ).
In particular, as expected, any Nash equilibrium solution of our original game V0(o0, ·, ·) induces a Nash equilibrium in any of
its reachable subgames, ensuring a rational behavior at each time step.
A.4 Solving POSGs as Occupancy Markov Games
A.4.1 An Abnormal-Form Game?
The next two lemmas lead to demonstrating that Vτ (oτ , 〈·, ·〉) is linear in βiτ ′ for i ∈ {1, 2} and τ ′ ≥ τ .
Lemma 9. At depth τ , T (oτ ,βτ ) is linear in β1τ and β2τ , where βτ = 〈β1τ , β2τ 〉.
Proof. Let oτ be an occupancy state at depth τ and βτ be a decision rule. Then the next occupancy state o˜ = T (oτ ,βτ )
satisfies, for any s˜ and (θ,a, z):
o˜(s˜, (θ,a, z)) =
∑
s∈S,θ∈Θ
oτ (s,θ)βτ (θ,a)P
z
a (s
′|s)
=
∑
s∈S,θ∈Θ
oτ (s,θ)β
1
τ (θ
1, a1)β2τ (θ
2, a2)P z
1,z2
a1,a2 (s
′|s)
=
∑
θ∈Θ
β1τ (θ
1, a1)β2τ (θ
2, a2)
(∑
s∈S
oτ (s,θ)P
z1,z2
a1,a2 (s
′|s)
)
.
The next occupancy state thus also evolves linearly w.r.t. private decision rules at τ .
Lemma 10. At depth τ , rτ (oτ ,βτ ) is linear in β1τ and β2τ , where βτ = 〈β1τ , β2τ 〉.
Proof. When visiting some occupancy state oτ (at depth τ ∈ {0, . . . , τmax − 1}), for joint behavioral decision rule βτ =
〈β1, β2〉, the expected immediate reward at τ is:
rτ (oτ ,βτ ) =
∑
s,a1,a2
(∑
θ
oτ (s,θ)β
1(θ1, a1)β2(θ2, a2)
)
r(s, a1, a2)
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=
∑
θ1,θ2
∑
a1,a2
β1(θ1, a1)β2(θ2, a2)
(∑
s
oτ (s,θ)r(s, a
1, a2)
)
,
i.e., it is linear in β1 as well as β2 (hence bilinear).
Corollary 2. At depth τ , Vτ (oτ ,βτ :H−1) is linear in β1τ ′ as well as β2τ ′ for any τ ′ ∈ {τ . .H − 1}.
Proof. First, the property trivially holds for τ = H − 1.
Let us now assume that it holds for some τ + 1 ∈ {1 . .H − 1}. Then, we have at τ :
Vτ (oτ ,βτ :H−1)= rτ (oτ ,βτ ) + γVτ+1
(
T (o,βτ ),βτ+1:H−1
)
{using Lemma 10:}
=
 ∑
θ,a1,a2
β1τ (θ
1, a1)β2τ (θ
2, a2)
(∑
s
o(s,θ)r(s, a1, a2)
)+ γVτ+1 (T (o,βτ ),βτ+1:H−1) .
As
• T (oτ ,βτ ) is linear in decision rules β1τ and β2τ (Lemma 9) and
• Vτ+1(oτ+1,βτ+1:H−1) is linear in oτ+1,
then, by composition (and other basic combinations), Vτ (oτ ,βτ :H−1) is linear in decision rules β
1
τ and β
2
τ .
Also, for any τ ′ > τ , the first term (expected instant reward) is independent of βτ ′ , and the second term is linear in β1τ ′ and
β2τ ′ (by induction hypothesis), so that Vτ (oτ ,βτ :H−1) is linear in β
1
τ ′ and β
2
τ ′ .
Repeating this process, by induction the property holds for all τ ∈ {0 . .H − 1}.
One issue is that Vτ (oτ ,βτ :H−1) is not linear in β
1
τ :H−1 but multi-linear in β
1
τ ′ for all τ
′ ≥ τ (idem for player 2). As a
consequence, this function may not be convex in β1τ :H−1 (or concave in β
2
τ :H−1).
A.4.2 Properties of the Maximin and Minimax Values
The next two results demonstrate that solvingQ∗(oτ ,βτ ) for maximin and minimax values allows finding one Nash equilibrium
strategy profile (NES), so that Bellman’s optimality principle can be applied.
Theorem 2. (originally stated on page 5) In the 2p zs abnormal-form game Q∗τ (oτ ,βτ ), the maximin and minimax values are
both equal to V ∗τ (oτ )—i.e., as previously defined, the NEV for game Vτ (oτ ,βτ :H−1)—and correspond to a NES.
Proof. Focusing, without loss of generality, on player 1, we have (complementary explanations follow for numbered lines in
particular):
maximin(oτ )
def
= max
β1τ
min
β2τ
Q∗τ (oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ )
= max
β1τ
min
β2τ
[
r(oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ ) + γV
∗
τ+1(T (oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ ))
]
(V ∗τ+1(T (oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ )) being the Nash equilibrium value of normal-form game Vτ+1(T (oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ ), µ
1, µ2):)
= max
β1τ
min
β2τ
[
r(oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ ) + γ max
µ1∈M1|oτ ,βτ 〉
min
µ2∈M2|oτ ,βτ 〉
Vτ+1(T (oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ ), µ
1, µ2)
]
= max
β1τ
min
β2τ
max
µ1∈M1|oτ ,βτ 〉
min
µ2∈M2|oτ ,βτ 〉
[
r(oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ ) + γVτ+1(T (oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ ), µ
1, µ2)
]
(using the equivalence between maximin and minimax values for the (constrained normal-form) game at τ + 1, the last two
max and min operators can be swapped:)
= max
β1τ
min
β2τ
min
µ2∈M2|oτ ,βτ 〉
max
µ1∈M1|oτ ,βτ 〉
[
r(oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ ) + γVτ+1(T (oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ ), µ
1, µ2)
]
(merging both mins (and with explanations thereafter):)
= max
β1τ
min
µ2∈M2|oτ ,β1τ 〉
max
µ1∈M1|oτ ,β1τ ,β2τ (µ2)〉
[
r(oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ (µ2)) + γVτ+1(T (oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ (µ2)), µ
1, µ2)
]
(4)
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(since ignoring the opponent’s decision rule does not influence the expected return:)
= max
β1τ
min
µ2∈M2|oτ 〉
max
µ1∈M1|oτ ,β1τ 〉
[
r(oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ (µ2)) + γVτ+1(T (oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ (µ2)), µ
1, µ2)
]
(using again the minimax theorem’s equivalence between maximin and minimax on an appropriate game:)
= max
β1τ
max
µ1∈M1|oτ ,β1τ 〉
min
µ2∈M2|oτ 〉
[
r(oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ (µ2)) + γVτ+1(T (oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ (µ2)), µ
1, µ2)
]
(5)
(merging both maxs (and with explanations thereafter):)
= max
µ1∈M1|oτ 〉
min
µ2τ |oτ )
[
r(oτ , β
1
τ (µ1), β
2
τ (µ2)) + γVτ+1(T (oτ , β
1
τ (µ
1), β2τ (µ2)), µ
1, µ2)
]
(6)
(again with the equivalence property discussed before the lemma:)
= max
µ1∈M1|oτ 〉
min
µ2∈M2|oτ 〉
Vτ (oτ , µ
1, µ2)
= max
β1
τ:H−1|oτ 〉
min
β2
τ:H−1|oτ 〉
Vτ (oτ , β
1
τ :H−1, β
2
τ :H−1)
def
= V ∗τ (oτ ).
More precisely, line 4 (and, similarly, line 6) is obtained by observing that
• minimizing over both (i) β2τ and (ii) µ2 constrained by oτ and βτ is equivalent to minimizing over µ2 constrained by oτ
and β1τ ; and
• in the reminder of the formula, decision rule β2τ at time depth can be retrieved as a function of µ2 (noted β2τ (µ2)).
Also, line 5 results from the observation that, while M1|oτ ,β1τ 〉 and M
2
|oτ 〉 allow to actually make decision over different time
intervals, we are here minimizing over µ2 while maximizing over µ1 over a function that is linear in both input spaces. This
amounts to solving some 2-player zero-sum normal-form game, hence the applicability of von Neumann’s minimax theorem.
The above derivation tells us that the maximin value (the best outcome player 1 can guarantee whatever player 2’s strategy) in
the one-time-step game is thus the Nash equilibrium value (NEV) for the complete subgame from τ onwards.
Theorem 3. (originally stated on page 5) As in 2p zs normal-form games, game Q∗τ (oτ ,βτ ) has at least one NES; all its NESs
are all value-equivalent; and solving for maximin and minimax values allows finding one NES.
Proof. When player 1 (resp. 2) selects a strategy guaranteeing the maximin (resp. minimax) value, the same value is
guaranteed for both players, so that none of them can do better by opting for a different strategy. This situation is thus, by
definition, a Nash equilibrium.
A.4.3 Maximin and Minimax Computation
The next two results demonstrate the Lipschitz-continuity of Q∗τ (oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ ) in both β
1
τ and β
2
τ , which will allow finding
-optimal solutions of the maximin and minimax problems.
Lemma 2. (originally stated on page 5) At depth τ , T (oτ ,βτ ) is linear in β1τ , β2τ , and oτ , where βτ = 〈β1τ , β2τ 〉. It is more
precisely 1-Lipschitz-continuous in oτ (in 1-norm), i.e., for any oτ , o′τ :
‖T (o′τ ,βτ )− T (oτ ,βτ )‖1 ≤ 1 · ‖o′τ − oτ‖1.
Proof. Let oτ be an occupancy state at time τ and βτ be a decision rule. Then the next occupancy state o
′ = T (oτ ,βτ )
satisfies, for any s′ and (θ,a, z):
o′(s′, (θ,a, z)) def= Pr(s′,θ,a, z|o, β1τ , β2τ )
=
∑
s∈S
Pr(s′, z|s,a)Pr(a|θ, β1τ , β2τ )Pr(s,θ|o)
=
∑
s∈S
P za (s
′|s)βτ (θ,a)oτ (s,θ)
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= β1τ (θ
1, a1)β2τ (θ
2, a2)
∑
s∈S
P za (s
′|s)oτ (s,θ).
The next occupancy state thus evolves linearly w.r.t. (i) private decision rules for a given private history, and (ii) the occupancy
state.
The 1-Lipschitz-continuity holds because each component of oτ is distributed over multiple components of o′. Indeed, let
us view two occupancy states as vectors x,y ∈ Rn, and their corresponding next states under βτ as Mx and My, where
M ∈ Rm×n is the corresponding transition matrix (i.e., which turns o into o′ def= T (oτ ,βτ ). Then,
‖Mx−My‖1 def=
m∑
j=1
|
n∑
i=1
Mi,j(xi − yi)|
≤
m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
|Mi,j(xi − yi)| (convexity of |·|)
=
m∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
Mi,j |xi − yi| (∀i, j, Mi,j ≥ 0)
=
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Mi,j︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
|xi − yi| (M is a transition matrix)
def
= ‖x− y‖1.
Lemma 3. (originally stated on page 5) For any τ and oτ , Q∗τ (oτ , β1τ , β2τ ) is Lipschitz continuous in both β1τ and β2τ .
Proof. As demonstrated in Sec. 5.1, Corollary 1, in finite horizon problems, the optimal value function is LC in occupancy
space.
Then, by definition:
Q∗τ (oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ ) = r(oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ ) + γV
∗
τ+1(T (oτ , β
1
τ , β
2
τ )),
where the first term (reward-based) is λr-LC (in each βiτ ), with λr =
maxs,a1,a2 r(s,a
1,a2)−mins,a1,a2 r(s,a1,a2)
2 , and the second
term is (γ · λH−τ · 1)-LC, with λH−τ = V
max
H−τ−V minH−τ
2 . Q
∗
τ is thus λ
Q∗
H−τ -LC with λ
Q∗
H−τ = λr + γ · λVH−τ .
A.5 Properties of V ∗
A.5.1 Finite-Horizon Lipschitz-Continuity of V ∗
The next two results demonstrate that, in the finite horizon setting, V ∗ is Lipschitz-continuous (LC) in occupancy space, which
allows defining LC upper- and lower-bounding approximators.
Lemma 4. (originally stated on page 6) At depth τ , Vτ (oτ ,βτ :H−1) is linear w.r.t. oτ .
Proof. This property trivially holds for τ = H − 1 because
VH−1(oH−1,βH−1:H−1) = r(oH−1,βH−1)
=
∑
s,a1,a2
(∑
θ
oH−1(s,θ)β1H−1(θ
1, a1)β2H−1(θ
2, a2)
)
r(s, a1, a2)
=
∑
s,θ
oH−1(s,θ)
∑
a1,a2
β1H−1(θ
1, a1)β2H−1(θ
2, a2)r(s, a1, a2)
 .
Now, let us assume that the property holds for τ + 1 ∈ {1 . .H − 1}. Then,
Vτ (oτ ,βτ :H−1) =
 ∑
s,a1,a2
(∑
θ
o(s,θ)β1τ (θ
1, a1)β2τ (θ
2, a2)
)
r(s, a1, a2)
+ γVτ+1 (T (o,βτ ),βτ+1:H−1)
15
=∑
s,θ
o(s,θ)
∑
a1,a2
β1τ (θ
1, a1)β2τ (θ
2, a2)r(s, a1, a2)
+ γVτ+1 (T (o,βτ ),βτ+1:H−1) .
As
• T (oτ ,βτ ) is linear in oτ (Lemma 2) and
• Vτ+1(oτ+1,βτ+1:H−1) is linear in oτ+1 (induction hypothesis),
their composition, Vτ+1(T (oτ ,βτ ),βτ+1:H−1), is also linear in oτ , and so is Vτ (oτ ,βτ :H−1).
Corollary 1. (originally stated on page 6) V ∗τ (oτ ) is Lipschitz continuous in oτ at any depth τ ∈ {0 . .H − 1}.
Proof. At depth τ , the value of any behavioral strategy βτ :H−1 is bounded, independently of oτ , by
V maxτ
def
=
1− γH−τ
1− γ maxs,a r(s,a) and
V minτ
def
=
1− γH−τ
1− γ mins,a r(s,a).
Because the occupancy space at τ is a probability simplex, for any o and o′ in this space, ‖o− o′‖1 ≤ 2. As a consequence,
such a value function being linear in oτ (cf. Lemma 4), it is also λH−τ -LC, i.e.,
|Vβτ:H−1(o)− Vβτ:H−1(o′)| ≤ λH−τ‖o− o′‖1 (∀o, o′),
with λH−τ =
V maxH−τ − V minH−τ
2
.
Considering now optimal solutions, this means that, at depth τ and for any (o, o′) ∈ Oτ :
V ∗τ (o)− V ∗τ (o′) = max
β1τ:H−1
min
β2τ:H−1
Vτ (o, β
1
τ :H−1, β
2
τ :H−1)− max
β′1τ:H−1
min
β′2τ:H−1
Vτ (o
′, β′1τ :H−1, β
′2
τ :H−1)
≤ max
β1τ:H−1
min
β2τ:H−1
[
Vτ (o
′, β1τ :H−1, β
2
τ :H−1) + λH−τ‖o− o′‖1
]− max
β′1τ:H−1
min
β′2τ:H−1
Vτ (o
′, β′1τ :H−1, β
′2
τ :H−1)
= λH−τ‖o− o′‖1.
Symmetrically, V ∗τ (o)− V ∗τ (o′) ≥ −λH−τ‖o− o′‖1, hence the expected result:
|V ∗τ (o)− V ∗τ (o′)| ≤ λH−τ‖o− o′‖1.
A.6 HSVI for POSGs
The following results help (i) tune zs-OMG-HSVI’s radius parameter ρ, ensuring that trajectories will always stop, and (ii)
then demonstrate the finite time convergence of this algorithm.
Lemma 5. (originally stated on page 7) Assuming a single depth-independent Lipschitz constant λ, and noting that
thr(τ) = γ−τ − 2ρλγ
−τ − 1
1− γ , (3)
one can ensure positivity of the threshold at any τ ≥ 1 by enforcing ρ < 1−γ2λ .
Proof. First, we have (for τ ≥ 1):
thr(τ) = γ−τ −
τ∑
i=1
2ρλγ−i
= γ−τ − 2ρλγ−1 γ
−τ − 1
γ−1 − 1
= γ−τ − 2ρλγ
−τ − 1
1− γ .
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Then, let us derive the following equivalent inequalities:
0 < thr(τ)
2ρλ
γ−τ − 1
1− γ < γ
−τ 
ρ <
1
2λ
1− γ
γ−τ − 1γ
−τ 
ρ <
1
2λ
1− γ
1− γτ .
To ensure positivity of the threshold for any τ ≥ 1, one thus just needs to set ρ as a positive value smaller than 1−γ2λ .
Lemma 6. (originally stated on page 8) Assuming a depth-independent Lipschitz constant λ, and with W def= ‖U (0) − L(0)‖∞,
the length of trajectories is upper-bounded by
Tmax
def
=
⌈
logγ
− 2ρλ1−γ
W − 2ρλ1−γ
⌉
.
Proof. (detailed version) Since W is the largest possible width, any trajectory stops in the worst case at depth τ such that
thr(τ) < W
γ−τ − 2ρλγ
−τ − 1
1− γ < W (from Eq. (3))
γ−τ
(
− 2ρλ
1− γ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 (Lem. 5)
< W − 2ρλ
1− γ
γ−τ <
W − 2ρλ1−γ
− 2ρλ1−γ
−τ ln(γ) < ln
(
W − 2ρλ1−γ
− 2ρλ1−γ
)
τ < logγ
(
− 2ρλ1−γ
W − 2ρλ1−γ
)
.
Theorem 4. (originally stated on page 8) Consider a trial (o0, . . . , oτ ) of length τ and consider that the backward updates of
Uτ−1 and Lτ−1 have not yet been performed. Then
1. width(Koτ−1 Vˆ (oτ−1)) ≤ thr(τ − 1)− 2ρλτ , and
2. for every o′τ−1 satisfying ‖o′τ−1 − oτ−1‖1 ≤ ρ, it holds: width(Koτ−1 Vˆ (o′τ−1)) ≤ thr(τ − 1).
Proof. Observe that from the definition of the sequence thr(τ) in Equation (2) it follows that
γthr(τ) = thr(τ − 1)− 2ρλτ .
Moreover, the trial terminated at depth τ . Therefore, o′ = oτ (the only occupancy state that can be reached from oτ−1 when
following βU,1, βL,2 from line 11 of Alg. 1) must satisfy
width(Vˆ (oτ )) ≤ thr(τ).
Then:
width(Koτ−1 Vˆ (oτ−1)) = width(HVˆ (oτ−1))
= HU(oτ−1)−HL(oτ−1) (def. of width(·))
= NEV(Γoτ−1(U))− NEV(Γoτ−1(L)) (def. ofH)
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= max
β1
min
β2
Q∗,U (oτ−1, β1, β2)−min
β2
max
β1
Q∗,L(oτ−1, β1, β2)
= min
β2
Q∗,U (oτ−1, βU,1, β2)−max
β1
Q∗,L(oτ−1, β1, βL,2)
≤ Q∗,U (oτ−1, βU,1, βL,2)−Q∗,L(oτ−1, βU,1, βL,2)
= γ(U(T (oτ−1, βU,1, βL,2))− L(T (oτ−1, βU,1, βL,2)))
= γwidth(Vˆ (oτ ))
≤ γthr(τ)
= thr(τ − 1)− 2ρλτ .
This proves the first point.
Now, the updated approximators Koτ−1Uτ−1 and Koτ−1Lτ−1 are both λτ -LC, which immediately gives the second point.
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